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1 Introduction 
The last 15 years have seen dramatic changes in the business environment driven  
by fundamental developments in technology, society and world politics. The evolution  
of new technology especially has facilitated the expansion of businesses as well as the 
globalisation of capital markets. While such changes were necessary for businesses’ 
growth and expansion, they have, however, created many challenges and concerns. 
Business transactions and structures have become more complex. Trading conditions 
have also become (and remain) very tough and competitive with new businesses 
emerging all the time. The rise in stock return volatility worldwide together with an 
increase in economic, political and regulatory uncertainty around the globe was also a 
concern. At the same time, the business scandals of the late 20th and early 21st century 
(e.g., Maxwell, Equitable Life, Enron, WorldCom, AIG, Lehman Brothers, Madoff) have 
shaken the confidence of investors and regulators. The survey of UK investors conducted 
by Cavendish Asset Management (2002) found that two thirds of UK investors no longer 
feel confident investing in the stock market as a result of fraud and accounting problems 
at Enron and WorldCom. Since then investors’ confidence has been further shaken by  
the scandals in the use of high risk investment vehicles such as securitised mortgages  
by large financial institutions. 
It is perhaps doubtful whether it would be possible for corporate accountants to put 
across the full complexity of an actuarial analysis of the risks and probable outcomes 
attending instruments such as Equitable Life’s guaranteed annuities, which gave rise  
to very uncertain outcomes in terms of liabilities which were affected not only by stock 
market returns but also by unknowns such as future life expectancies. Likewise, even 
leaving aside deliberate attempts to mislead, the expression of fair values for Enron’s 
energy supply contracts or WorldCom’s communications networks would inevitably have 
involved substantial problems in expressing risks and uncertainties to readers of accounts. 
Although such uncertainties may be expressible, the limited time available to investors 
for the analysis of accounts would be likely to nullify the usefulness of some of this risk 
reporting. In addition, the expression of very great uncertainties about future events 
would be likely to leave investors in a position in which they are really being invited  
to take a partially informed guess at the fair value of assets and liabilities, rather than 
being able to make reasoned estimates and quantify the probabilities of different levels  
of variance from those estimates. Nonetheless, the increasing impact of risk factors on 
which investors feel they have been misinformed or of which they feel they were not 
apprised, leads to an increasing demand for fuller information on risks of which managers 
of the corporation is aware. 
The presence or absence of risk information on which investors feel confident in 
basing investment decisions therefore has the potential to affect capital flows, not only 
from financial institutions investors and private investors to industrial companies, 
whether large, medium or small, but also between private investors and financial 
institutions whose ability to manage financial risk effectively can be called into question 
by events such as the sub-prime lending crisis of 2007–2008. Therefore improved risk 
reporting has at least the potential to contribute to a more stable environment for 
investment activity and capital accumulation. 
With these episodes in the business and investment environment in mind, there has 
been a rise in the attention and interest of investment regulators, accounting standard 
setters, stock markets, accounting institutes and firms and credit rating agencies 
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worldwide in the quality of financial reporting, including risk reporting. Regulators 
around the world have been actively considering how to promote better disclosure  
by listed companies in order to increase transparency of financial reporting hence restore 
investors’ confidence, especially by encouraging disclosures which will give investors 
and others a clearer idea of the risks faced by corporations. It might be anticipated that 
companies which raise capital through stock-market listings would increase their risk 
disclosures in order to reduce their cost of capital. This paper represents an effort  
to examine changes in the level of risk disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews corporate 
reporting and risk disclosure literature, covering its requirements and recommendations, 
and its motivations and benefits. Research hypotheses are developed in Section 3.  
Section 4 describes the selection of the sample and research method. Section 5  
presents the results and hypothesis testing. Section 6 discusses the results and Section 7 
presents our conclusions and makes suggestions for future research. 
2 Literature review 
2.1 Corporate reporting: the disclosure gap and motivation for change 
The rapid pace of change in the business environment has forced companies to use new 
types of information to manage their businesses. Many companies have adopted new 
performance measures for internal reporting purposes, such as those developed in the 
framework of the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). With regard to risk, 
various risk management methods have evolved over time. Companies have learnt to use 
sophisticated techniques to quantify and monitor risk effectively, thus reducing the 
quality gap in internal risk management systems. However, companies’ external reporting 
at the turn of the century was perceived as lacking an adequate disclosure on risk and 
uncertainties (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA, 1987) stated that the users of financial statements are increasingly 
demanding more information to help them assess risk and uncertainties. Schrand and 
Elliott (1998) summarised and documented the debate held in the 1997 AAA/FASB 
conference on risk reporting by companies to their stakeholders. They suggest that US 
companies were not providing sufficient information, related to risk, in their annual 
reports. In addition, there has been a growing perception that financial reporting 
standards developed by bodies such as the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the UK’s Accounting Standards Board (ASB) or those developed from civil 
law codes in continental Europe fell short of meeting all the information needs of all 
users. Previous disclosure research (e.g., Rankin, 1996) suggested that users, mainly 
investors, are demanding more information than they are getting. Further evidence  
(e.g., Beattie and Pratt, 2002; Solomon et al., 2000; ICAEW 1997, 1999; Schrand and 
Elliott, 1998) noted investors demand for more information to help them assess a 
company risk profile and make informed decisions. This has created a reporting gap or 
information problem. This information problem, actually a form of information 
asymmetry, occurs when management holds information and withholds it from investors 
for certain reasons, including commercial sensitivity and uncertainty about 
measurements. It is a key issue in corporate disclosure that may disturb the functioning  
of the capital markets leading to their partial or complete breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   4 B. Rajab and M. Handley-Schachler    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
This emphasised the importance of narrative disclosure where additional information 
on company’s performance, prospects, and risk and uncertainties are prepared.  
The regulator and accounting setters in the UK have long recognised the importance of 
the topic. The Companies Act 1985 requires companies for a ‘description’ of the 
principal risks and uncertainties that they face in a ‘business review’ section identified as 
part of the Directors’ Report (Companies Act 1985, S.234). There has been long 
constructive discussion and debate over the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) 
which was first launched by ASB in 1993 (ASB, 1993), with a revised statement being 
issued in 2003 (ASB, 2003), recommending UK listed companies to discuss principal 
risks and uncertainties. The issuance of the statement was an important shift emphasising 
the importance of narrative disclosure. The government concluded that it was not 
practical to regulate the OFR by law, partly because of the question of whether Directors 
could be sued over poor judgments in risk analysis published in the OFR (the question of 
safe harbour protection), and in 2006 it was left to the ASB to issue a Reporting 
Statement (replacing Reporting Standard RS 1) recommending that “the OFR should 
include a description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the entity together 
with a commentary on the directors’ approach to them” (ASB, 2006, para 52).  
The requirements for a business review remain. Risk disclosure is also influenced  
by the standard setters’ requirements through the issuance of accounting standards  
(e.g., FRS 13, IAS 32, IAS 39, IFRS 7 and IFRS 8) underpinning the reporting of risk.  
The growing literature on Corporate Governance (CG) provides further evidence that 
the information needs of users have been recognised by regulators and accounting 
professions. The CG debate began with the publication in 1992 of Cadbury Report which 
recognised the needs of users for some explanation of the factors likely to influence a 
company future progress. Cadbury Report was followed by the publication of a series of 
statements and guidelines (e.g., Combined Code and Turnbull Report). Under the 
Combined Code (1998), companies’ directors should state whether they complied with 
the code by conducting annual review of all controls and risk management system.  
The Turnbull Report issued in 1999 (Turnbull Report, 1999) underlined the importance 
of internal control and risk management and explicitly encouraged UK companies’ 
directors to provide the users of corporate report with high quality and meaningful 
information related to key risks. 
The information needs of users include those related to risk and uncertainties were 
also long noted and debated by accounting institutes worldwide. For example, in the UK, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) showed an early 
interest in the subject and issued several documents in order to help companies’ directors 
to identify, manage and measure risk and further enhance their public disclosure by 
providing more relevant risk-related information on all types of risk that have a potential 
bearing upon corporate performance. The best examples are Financial Reporting of Risk: 
Proposals for a Statement of Business Risk; issued in 1997; and No surprises: the case 
for better risk reporting issued in 1999.  
2.2 Corporate disclosure: motivations and benefits 
In research on corporate disclosure, the issue of understanding the motivations for 
disclosure has attracted considerable attention. Researchers on accounting disclosure 
have been applying a number of theoretical frameworks to explain what motivates 
managers to disclose more information than it is necessitated by regulation. However, 
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there is no single theory available to explain disclosure phenomenon completely, and 
researchers to date tend to select whichever theory articulates best with their hypothesis 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2000). Examples of theories include agency theory, signalling 
theory, stakeholders’ theory, capital need theory, political cost theory and benefit-cost 
theory. Linsley and Shrives (2000) suggest that some of these theories could be relevant 
for discussion of the motivation of risk disclosure. Companies may disclose information 
in order to meet investors demand for information, thus reduce their interference  
by publishing additional information. Information asymmetries can be a serious problem 
that if occurs it may disturb the functioning of the capital markets leading even to their 
partial or complete breakdown (Akerlof, 1970). The evidence (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
1996; Botosan, 1997; Hail, 2002) suggests that additional disclosure benefits companies 
as it increases transparency and reduces information asymmetries, thus reducing cost of 
capital. A reduction in information asymmetries makes investors more confident to trade 
at a fair price, leading to higher stock liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Welker, 
1995). Companies may benefit from making additional disclosure so as to send signals to 
the market that there is no need for new requirements (signalling theory) and/or reduce 
the chance of more detailed and perhaps more costly requirements being introduced by 
accounting regulators (political cost theory). 
The benefits of improved risk reporting should not be seen as being purely limited  
to individual investors or to the managers who gain investors confidence by such 
reporting. There are potential economic benefits to the wider community in terms of 
better risk-based resource allocation, with increased long-term capital formation as a 
result. The need to report on risks and risk management can also be expected to lead to 
improved internal information being collected on the risks that the enterprise faces,  
as well as the need to demonstrate that the risks identified are being managed, as 
shareholders hold directors to account for their risk management. 
However, companies’ directors are sometimes reluctant to disclose additional 
disclosure because competitors may make strategic use of information disclosed to their 
advantage (Edwards and Smith, 1996; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Tsakumis et al., 2006). 
This may lead to the imposition of a proprietary cost, hence putting a company at a 
competitive disadvantage and affecting the company negatively. Thus, a firm has to trade 
off the positive and negative effects of voluntary disclosure. 
In addition, it is essential to consider the differing demands of investors and 
regulators in different countries in examining the levels of risk reporting found in annual 
accounts. Culture, recent history and education can all affect market demand for such 
information. However, even without such demands, the demands of regulators will create 
differences in levels of risk reporting between different jurisdictions and between the 
firms listed on different stock exchanges. This gives rise to an expectation that companies 
listed in more than one country will on average disclose more about their risks than other 
companies, as they strive to meet the demands of their most exacting regulator,  
in addition to any particular requirements of the other regulators they must satisfy.  
For this reason, the present study examines the effects of US-listings on the level of risk 
reporting by UK companies. US-listed companies face additional risk reporting 
requirements under regulations such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Regulation S-K §229.503, requiring identification of key business factors in prospectuses 
(SEC, 2008c) and the requirement to repeat this information in the corporate annual 
report in (SEC, 2008a, Item 1A) UK firms with a US listing are required to reconcile 
financial statements to US accounting standards and submit this via form 20-F to the 
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SEC. The instructions for Form 20-F require that “the document shall prominently 
disclose risk factors that are specific to the company or its industry” (SEC, 2008b, p.11, 
Item 3D). Moreover, they are required to report on internal controls under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (2002), Sections 302 and 404, while section 401 requires enhanced disclosures 
on risks involved in off-balance sheet special purpose vehicles. 
2.3 Previous studies 
Recently there has been substantial growth in the research attention being devoted to risk 
disclosure in companies’ annual reports. Although corporate financial and environmental 
disclosures have been developing for a number of decades, recent evidence (e.g., Stanton 
and Stanton, 2002; Beattie, 2005) found little research related to annual report risk 
disclosure. This increase in attention for risk disclosure can be demonstrated by the 
increased focus being applied by governments and accounting regulators, and accounting 
institutions, signifying its importance. A number of studies examining risk disclosure 
started to evolve (e.g., Abraham and Cox, 2007; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Woods  
and Reber, 2003). These studies investigated different issues, covered different data sets; 
and applied different studies samples. For example, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
proposed a framework of risk communication and applied it on a sample of non-financial 
companies listed in the ordinary market on the Italian Stock Exchange. Woods and  
Reber (2003) carried out a pilot study on twelve companies to compare disclosure 
between UK and Germany. 
The present study fills a gap in the literature by providing a longitudinal study of the 
type and nature of corporate risk information disclosed in the annual report. This study 
distinguishes itself from previous studies as it seeks to determine whether companies’ 
annual report risk disclosure has enhanced over the years under study in response to 
recent regulatory changes and developments. 
3 Hypotheses development 
Given the debate on risk disclosure, the main impetus of this study was to determine 
whether risk disclosure in annual reports of UK firms has enhanced over the period under 
study in response to regulatory development and changes that occurred lately.  
Any increase in risk disclosure would be seen as evidence confirm the effectiveness  
of recent efforts at CG reforms (Solomon et al., 2000) and recommendations made  
by accounting institutes for enhancing risk disclosure and reducing information 
asymmetry. Patten (1992) and Deegan et al. (2000) provide examples of studies where 
the volume of environmental disclosure was shown to respond to the increased exposure 
to criticisms experienced after a particular event. Thus we would expect risk disclosure  
to have increased over the years, and operationalised this expectation in the following 
first research Hypothesis: 
H1: The level of risk disclosure has significantly increased over time in response to 
recent regulatory development and other pressure. 
Prior research suggests that several factors (e.g., financial factors, non-financial factors, 
and social responsibility factors) may determine firm’s disclosure policy. In this research 
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we investigated the effect of size, leverage, industry and US dual listing. These are the 
most commonly used independent variables in accounting disclosure research. 
Prior research (e.g., Hossain et al., 1994; Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; 
Depoers, 2000) suggests there may be a positive relation between disclosure and size. 
The proportion of outside capital tends to be higher for larger companies and agency 
theory suggests agency costs (monitoring costs) increase with the amount of outside 
capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus larger firms may have greater incentives  
to disclose more information in order to reduce agency costs, hence reduce information 
asymmetries between managers and shareholders. The demand for information by 
analysts could be greater on larger firms (Hossain et al., 1994). These argument leads to 
the second hypothesis: 
H2: The extent of risk disclosure is positively related to firm size. 
Industry can also be an important factor in explaining corporate disclosure (Beretta and 
Bozzolan, 2004). This variable may have the potential to influence the amount and nature 
of information disclosed by companies. The influence of industry variable has been 
proposed by political cost theory and signalling theory (Inchausti, 1997). Companies in 
certain industries (e.g., sensitive industries) will attract the attention of public and 
governmental bodies concerns (Adams et al., 1998). Disclosure may, therefore, serve as a 
mechanism to ensure that public concerns are answered. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
suggest that company risk profile is deeply influenced by the technological and market 
constraints exerted by the competitive industrial environment on the business models. 
Cooke (1992) found that Japanese manufacturing companies disclose more information 
than non-manufacturing firms. The above arguments lead us to the second hypothesis: 
H3: The extent of risk disclosure is higher for some firms (heavy industrial firms) than 
for other firms. 
Listing factor have been proposed by many studies in accounting disclosure as an 
important factor in explaining disclosure practices. Listing in foreign stock exchanges 
gives firms an opportunity to raise capital (perhaps at a lower cost) in the foreign capital 
markets. Firms may want to increase their disclosure, perhaps in order to create or 
maintain strong demand for their securities. Another reason that has been put forward for 
additional disclosure is that the foreign stock markets may require extra disclosure.  
This lead to the fourth hypothesis: 
 H4: The extent of risk disclosure is higher for UK firms with a US-dual listing than 
for those without a US-dual listing. 
It has been proposed that capital structure of a firm is related to agency cost (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency costs are higher in highly leveraged firms (i.e., more debt in the 
capital structures) because a large proportion of debt allows greater potential wealth 
transfers from debtholders to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, agency 
theory predicts that corporate disclosure is expected to increase with leverage. However, 
the empirical evidence on this hypothesis is contradictory. For example, Oliveira  
et al., (2006), Meek et al. (1995) and Raffournier (1995) found no significant relation 
with disclosure whilst others (e.g., Malone et al., 1993) found a positive association.  
The above arguments lead to the following fifth hypothesis. 
H5: The extent of risk disclosure is positively related to leverage.  
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4 Sample selection and research methods 
The analysis is based on a sample extracted from UK listed companies and covers three 
different time periods (1998, 2001 and 2004). Based on the selection criteria, a sample 
comprising annual reports of 52 non-financial companies listed in the FTSE-100 index 
was found. Thus, in total 156 annual reports were sought, collected and analysed.  
A three-year interval was chosen to give greater time coverage for the analysis, hence 
allowing more in-depth examination of the trends. Companies span a wide range  
of businesses. The 52 companies were classified into eight industry categories, based on 
London Stock Exchange (LSE) classification: namely, Resources (RE), Basic Industries 
(BI), General Industries (GI), Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods (NCCG), Cyclical Services 
(CS), Non Cyclical Services (NCS), Utilities (UT) and Information Technology (IT).  
To make comparison easier, Information technology is consolidated with CS because  
it has only one constituent company, Sage. Thus, this reduces industry categories to seven 
categories. Table 1 displays the sampled companies classified according to industry 
sectors. 
The sample size was limited by the number of available large listed companies in the 
UK. Nevertheless, sufficient data was obtained from these companies’ annual reports to 
allow conclusions to be drawn on the questions raised in this paper, as shown below.  
The sample size is comparable to other studies on corporate disclosure, such as Hail 
(2002), Oliveira et al. (2006) and Branco and Rodrigues (2008). 
Table 1 Sample selection 
Categories  Number of observant 
Resources (RE) 4 
Basic Industries (BI) 5 
General Industries (GI) 2 
Non-cyclical consumer goods (NCCG) 9 
Cyclical services and information technology (CS&IT) 22 
Non-cyclical service (NCS) 4 
Utilities (UT) 6 
Total 52 
Content analysis (e.g., Neu et al., 1998; Milne and Adler, 1999; Campbell, 2004; Linsley 
and Shrives, 2006) is used to determine the themes of risk disclosure. Content analysis 
can be used to note either the presence or the absence of a theme in written broadcast or 
other verbal material. It is useful method as it allows for disclosure to be systematically 
classified and compared and also useful in comparing trends (Milne and Adler, 1999). In 
content analysis, different counting measures can be used which include ‘word’, 
‘sentence’, ‘page’ and ‘number of lines’. In this study, ‘sentence’ was used as it is more 
likely to provide data which are complete, reliable and meaningful (Milne and Adler, 
1999). 
Content analysis requires the researcher to design and implement a coding scheme 
involving a number of stages (e.g., Weber, 1985; Wolfe, 1991). In the implementation of 
this approach, the researcher is required to determine the following: the research question 
(e.g., measuring risk disclosure); the codable document (e.g., annual report); the coding 
unit (e.g., sentence), disclosure categories (e.g., environmental risk, operational risk; 
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strategic risk); and the coding mode (e.g., manual). In addition, the researcher needs to 
assess the reliability of coding. Last of all, the coded information is subjected to 
interpretation. 
Following previous studies (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Woods and Reber, 
2003), an analysis instrument (checklist) was designed and utilised so disclosure can be 
classified according to four different quality variables to allow the examination of content 
and style of information disclosed. These variables include risk disclosure categories 
(Environmental risk, Operational risk and Strategic risk) (see appendix A); the nature of 
evidence (i.e., quantitative and qualitative); the type of news (good, bad, neutral) and 
news time-frame (past, future, non-time). Based on the coding scheme, each company’s 
annual reports (excluding accounts and the notes to accounts) for the fiscal years 1998, 
2001, and 2004 were examined and risk disclosure texts (containing risk relevant 
information that facilitates the reader to be better informed about past and potential 
threats or opportunities arising from external or internal variables, and about risk 
management (e.g., Linsley and Shrives, 2006) were detected and analysed manually.  
The texts were measured by the number of sentences and matched to risk disclosure 
categories. A set of decision rules were applied and a pilot sample of reports was 
analysed and a number of procedures were followed to ensure the reliability and  
validity of disclosure measure. Table 2 shows an analysis of risk disclosure sentence 
characteristics. 
Table 2 Analysing risk disclosure 
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5 Results 
5.1 Overall trends in risk disclosure 
Recently, there has been an increase in users’ demands for corporate information.  
The literature shows that companies were put under pressure to make even greater 
disclosure of corporate information especially those related to risks and uncertainties. 
This is the background against which the results of this study should be interpreted.  
This study sets out to examine how companies responded to the growing pressure and 
demands. Table 3 displays the results of content analysis. The table shows that all 
companies in the sample disclosed risk-relevant information. The results displayed in the 
table show that the average (mean) number of risk disclosure sentences has steadily 
increased across the period under study, rising from 50.23 sentences in 1998 to 64.94  
in 2001 and 93.5 in 2004. The table also shows that the average disclosure attributed to 
each category (i.e., environmental risk, operational risk and strategic risk) has also 
increased. This provides evidence that there is an upward trend in the average amount  
of risk disclosure being published by the sample of companies over the period from 1998 
to 2004. Average disclosure, regardless of form (quantitative and qualitative), time-scale 
(past, future, non-time) and type of news (good, bad or neutral) all increased overall. 
However, quantitative disclosure decreased slightly between 1998 and 2001 and bad 
news disclosure slightly decreased between 2001 and 2004. The results show that 
operational risk disclosure dominates, reflecting its growing importance. Items under this 
category such as risk management policies and internal control, liquidity and cash flow 
risk, environment and health and safety risk and compliance; received higher ranks than 
items covered under the other two categories. 
Table 3 The overall trend in risk reporting 
Year 1998 Year 2001 Year 2004 
Disclosure 
characteristics Code  N 
Average 
disclosure 
Average 
disclosure 
Average 
disclosure 
Quantity Total risk disclosure 52 50.23 64.94 93.5 
Environmental risk disclosure 52 7.64 12.43 19.28 
Operational risk disclosure 52 34.12 41.50 60.64 
Content 
Strategic risk disclosure 52 8.47 11.01 13.58 
Qualitative disclosure 52 43.40 58.36 84.10 Form of 
disclosure Quantitative disclosure 52 6.83 6.58 9.40 
Past news  52 7.11 8.42 10.96 
Non-time 52 26.43 38.25 52.21 
Time-scale 
Future 52 16.70 18.25 30.32 
Good news 52 20.97 29.84 43.98 
Bad news  52 2.63 3.39 3.37 
Type of news 
Neutral news 52 26.63 31.71 46.15 
The figures included in the table refer to the average number of risk disclosure sentences. 
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Table 2 provides an in-depth and detailed analysis of risk disclosure sentence 
characteristics. The table exhibits a clear analysis of the form and type of the information 
disclosed. 
The results show that companies reveal both qualitative and quantitative disclosure. 
However, qualitative disclosures dominate over quantitative disclosures. The companies 
also publish ‘past’, ‘non-time’, and ‘future’ disclosure with non-time disclosure found  
to be dominating. In terms of news type, it was noted that companies disclose little ‘bad 
news’ information in comparison to ‘good’ and ‘neutral’ news disclosures. 
5.2 Hypothesis testing 
To test hypothesis 1, A Wilcoxon signed rank test was conducted to evaluate whether the 
average level of risk disclosure in 2004 was higher than the average level in 2001 and  
in 1998. The results, displayed in Table 4, indicate that there are significant differences 
between years 1998–2001; 1998–2004 and 2001–2004. The z value = −4.538; −6.071 and 
−5.711, respectively, with a significant value of 0.000 each. A t-test for paired samples 
was also performed to determine if there was any significant difference between the mean 
level of risk disclosure in the different periods under examination. This is an additional 
test and is conducted to support the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results displayed in 
Table 5 also indicate that there are significant differences in the mean level of risk 
disclosure between the years, confirming the results of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. 
Table 4 Results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
 1998–2001 1998–2004 2001–2004 
Z  −4.538 −6.071 −5.711 
Asymp. Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 5 Results of the student t test 
 1998–2001 1998–2004 2001–2004 
T −5.404 −7.941 −6.088 
Sig (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
To test the remaining hypotheses, Pearson correlation coefficients have been computed to 
test the association between risk disclosure scores and the independent continuous 
variables (i.e., size and leverage). Table 6 gives the descriptive statistics for disclosure 
scores and the independent continuous variables. Pearson correlation coefficients are 
displayed in Table 6 (last column). Figures in the table are related to the most recent year, 
year 2004. 
The results indicate that there is no strong evidence that risk disclosure score is 
related to either size or leverage, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. Deloitte 
(2006) found that the quality of disclosure on markets and external environment did not 
vary by size of company. Other evidence (e.g., Aljifri, 2008) did not support a positive 
relationship between disclosure level and size. As with size variable, leverage was found 
to have insignificant association with the level of risk disclosure. Previous evidence 
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(Aljifri, 2008; Oliveira et al., 2006; Meek et al., 1995; Malone et al., 1993) tested the 
association between disclosure level and leverage variable is contradictory. 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients between risk disclosure and 
firm’s variables (size and leverage) 
 Min Max Mean SD Pearson correlation 
Risk disclosure score 28.00 275.00 93.50 54.12 N/A 
Size  0.084 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
6.57 11.98 8.46 1.23 
0.554 
Leverage  0.066 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
1.50 527.18 131.15 106.99 
0.660 
Total disclosure is the firm’s total number of risk disclosure sentences on three 
categories: namely, environmental risk, operational risk, and strategic risk disclosures. 
Size is the log of turnover at the fiscal year end of 2004. Leverage is the ratio of total debt 
to total equity. 
In an attempt to examine the relationship between the type of industry variable and  
risk disclosure level, the sample companies were initially categorised into seven 
industrial groups as explained above (and displayed in Table 1). Based on this 
classification, a One-way ANOVA test was carried out on most recent year results, year 
2004. Table 7 presents the results which show significant differences between industries. 
Table 7 Testing the differences in average (mean) risk disclosure between industries for the 
year 2004 (ANOVA test) 
RE BI NCCG CS&IT NCS UT GI ANOVA 
Industry 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. 
Mean 
Disc. F Sig. 
Average risk 
disclosure score 
(year 2004) 
121 177 112 60 92 97 101 5.091 0.000 
RE: Resources, BI: Basic industries, NCCG: Non-cyclical consumer goods,  
CS&IT: Cyclical services and information technology, NCS: Non-cyclical services,  
UT: Utilities, GI: General industries. 
Following this categorisation, the companies were also further divided into dichotomous 
groups based on whether they are industrial or non-industrial companies.  
This classification is in line with some previous studies (Adams et al., 1998; Raffournier, 
1995). The dichotomous approach was also followed to classify companies in the sample 
according to whether or not companies have a US dual listing in addition to their  
UK listing. Having developed this classification, two statistical tests were performed,  
a student’s t test and a Mann-Whitney U test. The results of the Student’s t test presented 
in Table 8 (panel A) suggest that there is a significant difference in risk disclosure score 
(p < 0.001) between the two groups of industries. As hypothesized, firms belonging  
to heavy industrial sectors are disclosing more information than those whose belong  
to non-industrial sectors. The Mann-Whitey U test yields a Z statistic −4.027 (p < 0.001), 
which supports the results of the student t test. 
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These two tests were also carried out on the data (results are displayed in Table 8, 
panel B) to test for the differences in mean risk disclosure scores between US dual listing 
and non US dual listing. The Student’s t test results (panel B) show that there is a 
statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) in risk disclosure scores between the two 
groups. It appears that UK firms with a US dual listing have a greater propensity to 
disclose information than other companies without a US dual listing. The Mann-Whitney 
U test yields a Z statistic of −0.3.89 (p < 0.001), which again supports the results of 
student t test. 
Table 8 Descriptive statistics and tests for risk disclosure score and firm’s categorical 
variables (industry and US dual listing variables) 
Panel (A) 
 Industrial (26) Non-industrial (26) Student’s t test 
2 – tailed 
probability 
Mean disclosure score 121.80 65.19 −4.398 0.000 
Std. Deviation 58.97 28.82   
Mann-Whitney Z = −4.027; 2 – tailed probability 0.000 
Panel (B) 
 
US dual listing 
(28) 
Non US dual listing 
(24) Student’s t test 
2 – tailed 
probability 
Mean disclosure score 124.08 67.28 -4.193 0.000 
Std. Deviation 60.41 29.65   
Mann-Whitney Z = −3.89; 2 – tailed probability 0.000 
6 Discussion of disclosure results 
In the basis of the comparison made over the period from 1998 to 2004, we observed 
what was expected that there is a general increase in the level of information disclosed  
on risk disclosure. Yet still relatively little detailed disclosure is provided. Much of the 
disclosure appears to be linked to general risk causes where companies report that  
they are expose to/or they may face various types of risks which may affect their 
operations (qualitative/future/neutral disclosure). Much of the disclosure was also on 
qualitative/non-time/neutral and qualitative/non-time/good news disclosure. These 
disclosures comprise those disclosures linked to internal control systems, risk 
management policies, corporate social responsibility risk (include health and safety and 
environment risk) and others. Overall, we have seen more reporting on risk factors, 
general statement of risk management policy, and control system than detailed reporting 
on what would be the impact of such risk. Some of the disclosure related to internal 
control is mandated under Turnbull committee, which requires a description of the 
system in place to identify, evaluate and manage risk. A general feature appears to be  
the desire of companies’ directors to provide bad news as well as good and neutral news 
although the level of bad news disclosure remains low. Another feature appears in the 
willingness of directors to disclose information related to the future. Evidence  
(e.g., Cabedo and Tirado, 2004; Solomon et al., 2000, Linsley and shrives, 2000) 
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suggests that investors demand more information related to the future, as it improves their 
decision making process. However, this demand is unlikely to be satisfied by present 
practice, as most of the disclosures related to the future are neutral news and qualitative. 
These disclosures are often bland and commonplace and lack the completeness that 
would be ensured by the inclusion of good and bad news and the concreteness of 
quantitative data. The results show little information linked to ‘future quantitative 
disclosure’ and ‘future bad news disclosure’. Evidence suggests (e.g., Skinner, 1994) that 
company directors withhold negative information (especially those related to the future) 
when they feel this is necessary to avoid excessive legal costs or reputation concerns. 
Nonetheless, understandably there are difficulties associated with forecasting the future 
and quantifying risk due for example to data availability and subjectivity in measurement.  
For example, one company writes 
“as a result of uncertainties, including the current economic conditions, it is 
considered difficult to forecast the level of losses for joint ventures and 
associates in 2002.” (Reuters Group plc, Annual Report 2001) 
This is an example of future bad news disclosure, as it deals exclusively with losses but  
it lacks any quantitative information. Other typical risk disclosure examples are presented 
in Appendix B. There are also some circumstances where directors are reluctant  
to release forward-looking risk information without safe harbour protection and when 
disclosure are deemed too commercially sensitive (Linsley and Shrives, 2005).  
The proposed ‘safe harbour’ provisions in the companies act 2006 may encourage 
companies to give greater details moving forward (ASB, 2007). 
The results show that listing and industry variables are significantly related to the 
level of risk disclosure. This was expected as there are additional disclosure requirements 
for companies quoted on US stock markets. For the industry variable, industrial 
companies were found to disclose more than other companies. This may be due to certain 
industries being subject to more complex regulations than others or the result of a herd 
instinct or bandwagon effect where companies increase their level of disclosure in order 
to avoid the appearance of failing to meet the standards set by other similar companies. 
The results suggest that the regulation effect far outweighs the market effect. However, 
prior evidence suggests that regulation influences the quantity of disclosure but cannot 
ensure the quality of information disclosed. 
7 Conclusion 
This study was carried out to examine how companies responded to recent regulatory 
developments and other pressures on corporate reporting. The study further examined  
the relationship between risk disclosure in annual report and four company variables 
include company size, industry type, US dual listing and leverage. 
Although disclosure level, reflecting the effect of regulation, was found to be 
increased over the years, the analysis indicates that there are so many bland statements 
being disclosed by companies. Thus, the nature of information disclosed is of 
questionable quality and hence of questionable relevance to investors. Investors may be 
concerned that risk disclosure may not fully enable them to assess companies risk 
profiles. Accordingly, the usefulness of the risk information disclosed by companies 
remains a question for future research. This is of considerable concern in the present 
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economic and financial environment. The scandals and failings in corporate management 
in recent years do not need to be addressed by bland statements and reassurances. Rather 
there is a need for full, detailed and unbiased statements of the risks that companies face, 
the degree of risk that managers are prepared to tolerate and the measures taken to keep 
risks within the tolerance level stated. 
The study has a number of limitations. Our sample was extracted from the FTSE 100 
companies so the sample choice should be considered when the conclusion is drawn.  
A further research study could extend the sample to include medium-sized and smaller 
companies. The second limitation is that our analysis is restricted to disclosure available 
on the annual report only. Previous evidence suggests that managers disclose good news 
forecasts information and bad news information (e.g., Skinner, 1994) promptly to avoid 
litigation costs. It is acknowledged that companies communicate with stakeholders 
through other channels, such as interim reports, preliminary announcements, and the 
internet. Future research could examine these other forms of information disclosure.  
Finally, in view of the potential role of risk disclosure in reducing information 
asymmetries and thereby increasing investors’ confidence, it would be valuable to 
conduct further research to establish whether there is any negative correlation between 
risk disclosure and cost of capital reflecting this improvement in investor sentiment. 
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Appendix A 
Risk disclosure categories 
A.1 Environmental risk 
Environmental risk arises from factors essentially beyond the organisation’s control  
and comprises disclosure relating to: 
• economic risk (e.g., interest rate, currency risk, price and commodity, inflation, 
taxation, credit risk) 
• political risk 
• social risk 
• regulation and legislation 
• industry sources (e.g., competition, potential entrants, suppliers, substitutes,  
strategic partners, customers (e.g., changes in demand, changes in clients 
requirements and customers preferences)) 
• climate and catastrophic. 
A.2 Operational risk 
Operational risk is the probability of losses arising from the essential operation side  
of the firm.  
Operational risk covers such issues as: 
• internal control and risk management policies 
• infrastructure risk 
• liquidity and cash flow 
• project failure  
• product failure 
• operational disruption 
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• operational problem 
• employment practices and workplace safety (H&S) 
• environment risk (risks arising from the impact of companies’ operations on the 
natural environment)  
• compliance and reputation 
• legal risk. 
A.3 Strategic risk 
Strategic risks arise from operating in a particular industry and are associated with the 
company’s future business plans and strategies. Strategic risks encompass: 
• research and development 
• product market 
• intellectual property right 
• acquisitions, alliances, joint ventures 
• management of growth 
• derivatives 
• investment 
• technology. 
Appendix B: Typical examples of risk disclosure 
Risk disclosure example  Risk category Sentence characteristics 
Wolseley has its principal operations in North 
America and Europe and therefore subject to 
specific risks of conducting business in these 
regions (Wolseley plc, Annual Report 2004) 
Strategic risk Non-
time/qualitative/neutral 
Hedging operations are subject to internal control 
including review by an internal audit function 
(Antogfasta, Annual Report 2004) 
Operational risk Non-time/qualitative/good 
Our lost time injury frequency improved by 15%  
in 2004, reducing to 0.6 injuries per million man 
hours worked (BG Group, Annual Report 2004) 
Operational risk Past/quantitative/good 
Management does not anticipate that the dispute 
with certain insurers over their declination of 
coverage of macrotextured product liability claims 
will be resolved during 2005. Consequently, it is 
expected that settlements with patients will not be 
reimbursed by insurers and that this will have an 
adverse impact on cash flow of a proximately £40m 
during 2005 (Smith and Nephew plc, Annual 
Report 2004) 
Operational risk Future/qualitative/bad 
Future/quantitative/bad 
 
